We refine an empirical commitment (to be data-driven) into our deepest notion of truth, and consider other types of truths to be at most metaphors. We give up on significant post-foundational involvement in philosophy for these matters - the physical nature of the universe is delegated as an intellectual realm which we approach through the constructed lens of science (and related disciplines, such as history) (even as we may refine that lens with and we know we built it from philosophy). The realm of 「is」 (using the term in the same sense as the word 「truth」) is established, and demands universal allegiance.
We retain for deeper involvement in philosophy questions of metaphysics, values, and the like, but particularly pay attention to value-philosophy as a distinct and radically-divergent realm. For this realm, we note that rather than discovering truths, we propose conclusions and frameworks, which are judged by the aesthetics of their relations to other conclusions and frameworks as well as the aesthetics of their application. The construction of a life-philosophy from these ideas is done through a combination of reflective equilibrium (see Rawls for one form of this concept) and aesthetic judgement over relevant abstractions (consider framing). We note that non-philosophers might either do this very lightly, or might primarily rely on a value system already built through this means (taking it mostly as a whole because of tradition, upbringing, or a particularly strong aesthetic appeal).
With empirically-arrived truth claims, and a sufficiently mature life-philosophy with its associated value-framework, concrete action to best realise the values embedded in the philosophy are possible. A good grasp on truth and a good grasp on one's values create the potential for moral reasoning and application of morals (whether one uses a proper philosophical value system one has considered, a philosophical value system one was convinced of that came from another, or a precodified value system (likely religious in origin).
We note in particular that any value system where the primary motivation is to avoid an unpleasant afterlife is disqualified from being deeply moral for the participants (even if those who created that value system may be, after a sort), not because there is any objective badness we might apply to it (badness is a conclusion one makes at philosophical layers after one is in the realm of values), but rather because it moves value-relevant actions out of the realm of being significant to ones values into the realm of self-aiming punishment avoidance.