(Note that while I marked this (thinking mainly about the first topic) with the Feminism tag, that is because it is relevant to feminism; I hold that it is perfectly compatible with (but not inspired) second-wave feminism but not compatible with third-wave feminism)
Three topics, starting with beauty:First:Beauty is an attribute we judge in people and things around us. Aesthetics, as the regularities between our judgements of beauty, is partly innate and partly developed. The development of a person's aesthetic sense is significantly cultural, and we have evidence of a wide variety of aesthetic content over the span of years and cultures in known history. On the biological side, aesthetics in the human form probably came from selective pressure; highly asymmetric features or signs of poor health were not signs of genetic or actual fitness. As adults, we deal with our aesthetics as a mostly-monolithic whole; to whatever extent our notion of the beauty of women comes from having seen Highlander (I confess to finding Sean Connery very attractive) or a succession of disney princesses during our youth, it is difficult-to-impossible to imagine what we might be had we been raised differently; we both lack access to whatever an uninculturated aesthetics would be and lack bridges to easily understand very different inculturations (I believe it is possible to do so, but it takes considerable effort).
I identify in third-wave feminism a tendency to deconstruct beauty, in the name of anti-ableism, anti-transism, anti-obesity-phobism, and a number of other things. I largely reject this element in third-wave feminism.
- First, I hold that it is not mandatory or desirable to validate everyone in society
- Second, some of these traits are legitimately problematic. We all have plenty of traits, some of them are pretty broken. Having a deformed body is not something to be proud of, but people can get past it, knowing that they're being evaluated on many fronts. Someone who is blind does have a defective body, and that's unfortunate, but they are still human, and still capable of most things other humans are. Excluding them from society is to waste their potential.
- Third, it is unacceptable to mandate aesthetics of individuals. Stifling the aesthetic sense, and attaching to it corrective pressures is unacceptably stifling to human happiness.
Note that one task for feminism that's related to this is destroying the double standard for beauty; there should be no higher obligation for women to be attractive than for men. While as individuals we might legitimately decide to pay more attention to the attractiveness of people of our preferred gender(s), we should aim to form a society that on average does not do that, and one which in areas where attractievness is not strictly important it's not used as a strong factor in how successful people are. We don't have to want to date people who strike us as ugly, but we should not judge them unfairly in non-aesthetic judgements based on that either; we waste their potential that way.
Next:A commentary on 「Check your privilege」, a phrase commonly used (and linked to the above) in third-wave feminist discourse. I reject and condemn this phrase, even if some of the sentiment behind it is reasonable. I recognise the notion of privilege; some people have invisible things that make their life easier, and they may not be accustomed to the difficulties of those of us off the beaten path in our perspectives, orientations, and lifestyles. It is sometimes reasonable to inform/remind them of that privilege. Unfortunately, 「Check your privilege」 is about the worst way to do that. For those completely unaccustomed to the idea of privilege, it is a capital-t term that's a very unwelcoming introduction to this style of thought, and for those who are already accustomed to it but missing an angle, it adds nothing to what should be that kind of broadening discussion. Instead, it feels like a disqualification argument, particularly (but not only) if not paired with perspective-broadening discourse. It is simply not worth saying, and should be met with scorn.
Commentary on smaller parts of the linked document:
- Learning to listen rather than speak - Much conversation is best done as dialogue. In general conversations, we should be just as willing to challenge their ideas and learn from them as we would in any other intellectual discussion. As for minority spaces for griping and the like, we should reject them if they have intellectual misbehaviour, and be reluctant to enter them at all if they have that kind of dedicated-soapboxing going on. The deference in any conversation with minorities the author suggests is unacceptable.
- I disagree on the sympathy-versus-empathy point; I believe that with sufficient work in understanding their positions and life, one can have real empathy for others. This can be a work-in-progress kind of thing, but it can also be real.
- On a language of respect and equality, I think we need to be very careful. Revising language can be a worthwhile effort to change public discourse, but such revision should be heartfelt and based on careful consideration, not based on deference. Resisting pressure to use someone else's world-of-terms is potentially a very positive thing; a self-respecting philosophical person chooses the terms that make up their worldview carefully. Deferring just because someone wants you to, or to make that person comfortable, is a terrible habit
- I particularly disagree with "Intent isn't an excuse". Intent is critical to language choice, and often people might unreasonably prefer that others talk like they do. It is for them to convince us, or for us to convince ourselves, to change our language. Without ill-intent, there is no foul, just consequences. We don't have to learn the lingo, and don't have to recognise minority spaces as such. All spaces are philosophical spaces, and we should push good patterns of philosophical discourse.
Finally:As an application of the general principle that people may define themselves as they choose but others are not obligated to recognise them the same way, I think the current discussion on whether Mitt Romney (and mormons in general) is a Christian is an entirely fair one. The differential-definitions of Christianity have long been a point-of-contention, even with attempts like the Nicene Creed to define it more solidly. A reasonable person might have many different clouds of what it means to be Christian in their head (just as we might reasonably find it tricky to judge whether the Bahai are Muslim, even with the Five Pillars as definitional for many). I am bothered by the context of the question, in that I don't think it's important whether Romney's faith is Christian or something else (I in fact would strongly prefer nonreligious people leading nations), but it's at its core a valid question, and it cannot be obligatory for people to accept a professed identity from others as the foundation for their categories.
From the last point in that (long) cut, I want to point out some term usage (as I use them):
- Category-membership is an external classification based on someone's attributes. Not everyone's world-of-terms will agree as to how people-or-things should be categorised; everyone makes their own categories into which they put other people, and category systems neither do nor should agree on everything.
- Identity is a decision to make a self-categorisation part of a public statement as to what the flavour of one's person is. It often implies loyalty or accompanying cultural membership. Identification is self-built.